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                                               NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
                                 
                 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
                     FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
                                                
                                 
                          No. 01-2602 
                                                
                                 
                    ESTATE OF ANN KROFCHECK 
                   (Widow of PAUL KROFCHECK), 
                                 
                                                                           
Petitioner 
                                 
                                v. 
                                 
      DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION PROGRAMS, 
               UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR 
                                                
                                 
              On Petition for Review of an Order  
                  of the Benefits Review Board 
               United States Department of Labor 
                      No. BRB-00-0701 BLA 
                                                
                                 
           Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
                        February 5, 2002 
                                 
          Before: SLOVITER, and AMBRO, Circuit Judges 
                    POLLAK*, District Judge 
                                 
                 (Opinion filed March 12, 2002) 
                                 
                                                
                                 
                            OPINION 
                                                
                                                
     *Honorable Louis H. Pollak, United States District Judge for the 
Eastern District 
of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation. 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
 
     The estate of a deceased miner's widow appeals the Department of 
Labor Benefits 
Review Board's affirmance of the denial of miner's and survivor's benefits 
under the 
Black Lung Benefits Act, 30 U.S.C.  901 et seq.  We affirm. 
                               I. 
     Paul Krofcheck (the "miner") worked in underground mines for fifteen 
and one- 
half years.  A blood gas study performed in 1973 yielded values too high 
to qualify him 
for a statutory presumption of pneumoconiosis, or "black lung" disease.  
He filed a claim 
for miner's benefits on May 22, 1978.  On August 23, 1978, he was admitted 
to the 
hospital with partial paralysis of his right side.  Three days later he 
suffered congestive 
heart failure.  A pulmonary function test administered on September 11, 
1978, found 
results that qualified him for a statutory presumption of pneumoconiosis.  
At the time of 
this test the examining doctor concluded that he suffered from "moderately 
severe 
obstructive ventilatory pattern, with excellent response to 
bronchodilators.  Compatible 
with reversible bronchospasm."  He was released and readmitted several 
times during the 
next months, each time with diagnoses of congestive heart failure.  He 
died on February 
24, 1979, with the cause of death listed as "cardiac arrest due to 
coronary occlusion with 
myocardial infarction due to arteriosclerotic heart disease."  
     The procedural history of this action spans twenty-three years, and 
is well known 
to the parties.  We will summarize it briefly.  Ann Krofcheck, the miner's 
widow, filed a 
claim for survivor's benefits on March 11, 1979.  The Department of Labor 
denied both 
survivor's benefits and miner's benefits after determining that the 
evidence did not show 
that the miner suffered from pneumoconiosis at the time of his death.  
After a series of 
hearings, remands, and requests for reconsideration, the Administrative 
Law Judge 
("ALJ") denied benefits once again on March 17, 2000, and the Board 
affirmed on May 
22, 2001.  Claimant appealed.   
                              II. 
     We review the Board's decision for errors of law and to determine if 
it adhered to 
its statutory scope of review.  Kertesz v. Crescent Hills Coal Co., 788 
F.2d 158, 162 (3d 
Cir. 1986).  The ALJ's findings of fact are conclusive if supported by 
"substantial 
evidence in the record considered as a whole."  33 U.S.C.  921(b)(3) 
(2001), 30 U.S.C.  
932(a) (2001).  We must independently review the record to determine if 
substantial 
evidence exists to support the ALJ's findings.  Lango v. Dir., Office of 
Workers' Comp. 
Programs, 104 F.3d 573, 576 (3d Cir. 1997).  Substantial evidence is "more 
than a mere 
scintilla."  Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (citation 
omitted).  It is not "a 
large or significant amount of evidence, but rather 'such relevant 
evidence as a reasonable 
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'"  Pierce v. 
Underwood, 487 U.S. 
552, 565 (1988) (citation omitted). 
                              III. 
     On March 2, 2001, the Board requested that the parties brief the 
question of 
whether 20 C.F.R.  718.104(d) (2002) applies to the claim at issue.  
Revisions to this 
regulation require the adjudicator of a claim to "give consideration to 
the relationship 
between the miner and any treating physician whose report is admitted into 
the record." 
Id.  The adjudicator may give controlling weight to the treating 
physician's opinion 
"provided that [the weight assigned] shall also be based on the 
credibility of the 
physician's opinion in light of its reasoning and documentation, other 
relevant evidence 
and the record as a whole."  Id.  The Board held that "[t]he revisions to 
the regulation at 
20 C.F.R. 718.104(d) apply to claims filed after January 19, 2001.  
Consequently, the 
provision requiring that special consideration be accorded to the report 
of a treating 
physician does not apply to the instant claim."  
     The Board did not err in its conclusion that the "treating physician 
rule" of 20 
C.F.R.  718.104(d) does not apply here.  20 C.F.R.  718.101(b) reads:  
          The standards for the administration of clinical tests and 
examinations 
     contained in this subpart shall apply to all evidence developed by 
any party 
     after January 19, 2001 in connection with a claim governed by this 
part . . . 
     These standards shall also apply to claims governed by part 727 
[Review of 
     Pending and Denied Claims under the Black Lung Benefits Reform Act of 
     1977] . . . but only for clinical tests or examinations conducted 
after 
     January 19, 2001. 
 
(emphasis added).  Because  718.101 applies the new standards its subpart 
sets out only 
to examinations conducted after January 19, 2001,  718.104's treating 
physician rule 
does not apply to this case.   
     Claimant attempts to use  725.2(b) and (c) to justify applying the 
rule 
retroactively to her case.  As she points out, these sections provide that  
"this part" applies 
to claims pending on August 18, 1978 and to claims pending on January 19, 
2001.  
However, it is clear from the context that the words "this part" refer to 
the provisions of  
725, not to those of  718.  Claimant cannot use  725's language to 
justify applying the 
treating physician rule of  718.104.  
     Claimant next argues that the ALJ and Board erred in not invoking the 
interim 
presumption in 20 C.F.R.  727.203 (1999) of death due to pneumoconiosis, 
established if 
one of four conditions is met and the miner has worked in a mine for ten 
years.  These 
conditions are:  
          (1) A chest roentgenogram (X-ray), biopsy, or autopsy 
establishes the 
     existence of pneumoconiosis . . .; (2) Ventilatory studies establish 
the 
     presence of a chronic respiratory or pulmonary disease . . . as 
demonstrated 
     by values which are equal to or less than the values specified in the 
     following table; (3) Blood gas studies which demonstrate the presence 
of an 
     impairment in the transfer of oxygen from the lung alveoli to the 
blood as 
     indicated by values which are equal to or less than the values 
specified in 
     the following table; (4) Other medical evidence, including the 
documented 
     opinion of a physician exercising reasoned medical judgment, 
establishes 
     the presence of a totally disabling respiratory or pulmonary 
impairment.   
 
20 C.F.R.  727.203 (1999).  Claimant argues that  727.203(2)'s 
presumption is invoked 
because ventilatory studies establish that the miner had qualifying forced 
expiratory 
volume (FEV) values.  Claimant also argues that pneumoconiosis is 
established under  
727.203(4), which invokes the presumption if "[o]ther medical evidence, 
including the 
documented opinion of a physician exercising reasoned medical judgment, 
establishes the 
presence of a totally disabling respiratory or pulmonary impairment."   
     The ALJ determined that the studies claimant relies upon were not 
valid and 
credible, and therefore did not invoke  203(a)(2)'s interim presumption.  
Specifically, he 
pointed to the lack of spirometric tracings and to the absence of a 
statement of the miner's 
understanding and cooperation that 20 C.F.R.  410 requires.  Id.   
Claimant argues that 
the tracings were destroyed in accordance with regular hospital procedure, 
and that Dr.  
C. Vaughn Strimlan's assurances that the miner's effort and cooperation 
were good 
should cure any deficiencies.  She argues that the ALJ erred in holding 
that these tracings 
were mandatory.  In fact the ALJ did not so hold, but rather evaluated Dr. 
Strimlan's 
assurances that the test results were valid and discounted them.   
     There was substantial evidence for the ALJ's conclusion.  The ALJ 
faulted Dr. 
Strimlan for failing to consider the effect of the miner's stroke.  He 
concluded that Dr. 
Strimlan's statement at the time of the test (that the miner suffered from 
"moderately 
severe obstructive ventilatory pattern, with excellent response to 
bronchodilators.  
Compatible with reversible bronchospasms"), which is inconsistent with 
"the progressive 
and irreversible nature of pneumoconiosis," was more credible than the 
statements he 
made years later.  The ALJ gave greater weight to the opinion of Dr. Leon 
Cander, who 
concluded that heart failure caused the pulmonary test results, citing the 
normal results 
obtained prior to the miner's heart failure.  
     The record also provides substantial evidence to support the ALJ's 
decision not to  
invoke  203(a)(4)'s interim presumption, thereby rejecting the opinions 
of Drs. Strimlan 
and Allan Freedman, who believed that the miner was disabled by 
pneumoconiosis, and 
that it in part caused his death.  The ALJ cited the negative X-ray 
evidence and the fact 
that the pulmonary function test the doctors relied upon revealed results 
inconsistent with 
pneumoconiosis ("excellent response to bronchodilator").  He noted that 
the miner's 
arterial blood gas results were normal thirty years after he left the 
mine, and only became 
abnormal following his stroke.  Coupled with Dr. Cander's analysis, this 
was substantial 
evidence for not invoking the interim presumption under  727.203(a)(4). 
     Claimant argues that the ALJ erred in holding that even if an interim 
presumption 
under  727.203(a) were invoked, it was rebutted.  Appellant's Br. at 20-
21. We need not 
reach this issue because the ALJ relied upon substantial evidence to 
determine that no 
such presumption was invoked.  
     Finally, claimant contends that the ALJ erred in not performing a de 
novo review 
of the lay evidence under  727.203(a)(5) and that the Board erred in 
holding this to be 
harmless error.  Section 727.203(a)(5) provides that "[i]n the case of a 
deceased miner 
where no medical evidence is available, the affidavit of the survivor of 
such miner or 
other persons with knowledge of the miner's physical condition, 
demonstrates the 
presence of a totally disabling respiratory or pulmonary impairment."  The 
ALJ stated 
that "this decision is based upon a complete and thorough de novo review 
of all of the lay 
and medical evidence."  He "carefully reviewed and weighed the testimony 
of the miner's 
widow . . . and [her] lengthy handwritten letter dated October 26, 1982."  
He concluded 
"although the lay evidence (as well as the medical evidence) indicates 
that the miner was 
disabled by health problems (e.g., heart disease, stroke), it fails to 
establish total disability 
due to a respiratory or pulmonary condition."  These statements indicate 
that the ALJ did 
perform a de novo review of the lay evidence; hence we need not decide 
whether his 
failure to do so constituted harmless error.   
 
                              IV. 
 
     For the foregoing reasons, the Board's decision is affirmed.      
 
                                                               
 
TO THE CLERK: 
 








                               /s/ Thomas L. Ambro   
                                    Circuit Judge 
